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This paper provides an elementary tutorial overview of Bayesian inference and its 
potential for application in aerospace experimentation in general and wind tunnel testing in 
particular. Bayes’ Theorem is reviewed and examples are provided to illustrate how it can 
be applied to objectively revise prior knowledge by incorporating insights subsequently 
obtained from additional observations, resulting in new (posterior) knowledge that combines 
information from both sources. A logical merger of Bayesian methods and certain aspects of 
Response Surface Modeling is explored. Specific applications to wind tunnel testing, 
computational code validation, and instrumentation calibration are discussed. 
Nomenclature 
 =  angle of attack, Type I inference error probability 
 =  angle of sideslip, Type II inference error probability 
d = order of polynomial 
F = generic response symbol 
i, j = index variables 
k = number of independent variables 
K = number of regressors in a polynomial model 
p = number of parameters in a polynomial model, including intercept 
p′ = maximum acceptable inference error probability 
p00 = probability that if a candidate model term was rejected in the last experiment, it will be rejected in the  
  next replicate of that experiment 
p01 = probability that if a candidate model term was rejected in the last experiment, it will be retained in the  
  next replicate of that experiment 
p10 = probability that if a candidate model term was retained in the last experiment, it will be rejected in the  
  next replicate of that experiment 
p11 = probability that if a candidate model term was retained in the last experiment, it will be retained in the 
  next replicate of that experiment 
0 = proportion of times that a candidate model term is rejected in a series of replicated experiments 
1 = proportion of times that a candidate model term is retained in a series of replicated experiments 
RSM = Response Surface Methods/Models/Modeling 
X = design matrix 
alternative hypothesis = assertion that a significant difference exists between an estimated response and  
      a given reference 
coding     = linear transformation of variables into a range convenient for  processing 
conditional probability = probability that one event will occur, given the occurrence of another event  
confidence interval  = precision interval when n = infinity 
explained SS    = sum of squares attributable to known causes 
F-Value     = ratio of mean square for an effect to residual mean square 
factor     = an independent variable; e.g. angle of attack 
factor level    = a specific value for an independent variable; e.g., angle of attack = 2° 
graduating function  = low-order approximation to true but unknown response  function 
hierarchy     = condition in which higher order terms are accompanied by component lower-order term 
inference     = decision to reject either a null hypothesis or its corresponding alternative 
inference space     = a coordinate system in which one axis is assigned to each independent variable 
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interaction effect   = change in effect due to change in factor level from low to high 
joint probability   = probability of two events both occurring 
LOF     = lack of fit 
main effect    = change in response due to change in factor level from low to  high 
marginal probability  = probability that an event will occur, independent of whether  another event occurs 
MDOE     = Modern Design of Experiments 
mean square    = ratio of sum of squares to degrees of freedom; variance 
null hypothesis   = assertion than no difference exists between an estimated  response and a  
      given reference 
OFAT     = One Factor At a Time 
orthogonal    = state in which regressors are all mutually independent 
regressor     = term in a regression model 
residual     = difference between measurement and some reference 
residual mean square = residual sum of squares divided by residual degrees of freedom 
residual SS    = difference between total sum of squares and explained sum of squares 
response surface model = mathematical relationship between a response variable and multiple  
      independent variables 
significance    = risk of erroneously rejecting a null hypothesis 
site     = a point within an inference space representing some unique  combination of  
      factor levels 
t-limit     = minimum acceptable signal-to-noise ratio  
t-value     = measured quantity expressed as multiple of standard error in  measurement 
Type-I inference error = erroneous rejection of a null hypothesis 
Type-II inference error = erroneous rejection of an alternative hypothesis 
I. Introduction 
t is common to approach the analysis of information obtained in a response surface modeling experiment such as a 
wind tunnel test or a force balance calibration as if it stands alone, notwithstanding the fact that considerable prior 
information may exist on the subject under study in the experiment. A wind tunnel test may feature the replication of 
measurements acquired earlier on the same model, either in that facility or in another wind tunnel. An instrument 
undergoing a calibration may have been calibrated numerous times before. While it is not uncommon to compare 
current and prior results in such circumstances, such a comparison seldom extends beyond a subjective assessment 
that the agreement is generally satisfactory, or that it is sufficiently poor to be of concern. We do not usually exploit 
the fact that earlier experiments have yielded results that might be combined with our most recent findings to 
produce a composite outcome that reflects both the current and prior work. 
There are several reasons to recommend such an integration of prior and current results when the opportunity 
presents itself to do so. By including prior data in the current analysis, the researcher avails himself of additional 
degrees of freedom that can reduce inference error risk in the current experiment and increase the precision with 
which results can be reported. That is to say, such a strategy has the potential to significantly reduce uncertainty, 
thereby improving the quality of the final result. Furthermore, these benefits can be obtained ―for free,‖ in that the 
expense of obtaining them has already been incurred, either by the researcher himself in a prior experiment or by 
some other research program entirely. In the former case, the merging of prior and current experimental findings 
results in an averaging down of the researcher’s per-test costs. In the latter case, it results in a cost-effective 
leveraging of findings published in the literature or shared directly by colleagues who are able to do so. 
An objective, systematic mechanism for merging current and prior experimental results is necessary to take 
advantage of this potential opportunity for quality improvement and average cost reduction. Fortunately, this 
mechanism is available in the form of Bayesian revision in statistical analysis. Bayesian revision can be applied to a 
statistical representation of the random variables comprising any experimental data sample to generate revised 
estimates for the location and dispersion metrics that characterize the probability distributions of such data, which 
reflect both prior and current information. This paper proposes the merger of such Bayesian methods with the 
response surface methods that are a key element of an integrated experiment design, execution, and analysis process 
known at NASA Langley Research Center as the Modern Design of Experiments. 
The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. Section II discusses the role of formal inference in 
the Modern Design of Experiments. Section III reviews Bayes’ Theorem and gives examples of Bayesian inference. 
Section IV describes potential applications of Bayesian inference to response surface modeling experiments. Section 
I 
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V discusses certain aspects of Bayesian inference that distinguish it from conventional inference methods. Section 
VI provides some concluding remarks. 
II. The Role of Formal Inference in the Modern Design of Experiments 
The Modern Design of Experiments (MDOE) is an adaptation of industrial designed experiments that focuses on 
the special requirements of empirical aerospace research, including wind tunnel testing.
1
  It was first applied to wind 
tunnel testing at NASA Langley Research Center in 1997 and has since been used in over 100 major experiments as 
a means of delivering higher quality and greater productivity than conventional one factor at a time (OFAT) testing 
methods used traditionally in experimental aeronautics. Differences between MDOE and OFAT methods for wind 
tunnel testing stem primarily from contrasting views of the objective of this activity. Colloquially stated, 
conventional OFAT practitioners conduct wind tunnel tests to acquire data, while MDOE practitioners conduct wind 
tunnel tests to acquire knowledge. That is, the OFAT practitioner’s typical test strategy is to directly measure system 
responses such as forces and moments for as many independent variable (factor) combinations of interest as 
resource constraints will allow, while the MDOE practitioner’s typical strategy is to make some relatively small 
number of measurements that is nonetheless ample to develop a mathematical model that can adequately predict 
responses for all factor combinations of interest, and to make no more measurements than that. 
MDOE predictions are based on response surface models fitted by regression or other means from a sample of 
experimental data. The size of this sample is minimized to reduce direct operating cost and cycle time as noted, and 
the selection and acquisition order of the individual data points are optimized to reduce uncertainty in predictions 
made from models that are fitted from the data.
2,3
 
Fitting a regression model to a relatively small data sample offers certain advantages over the traditional OFAT 
exhaustive enumeration strategy that requires every interesting combination of independent variable levels to be 
physically set. Besides the obvious cost and cycle-time reductions achievable by minimizing data volume, the 
modeling approach enables interpolation, so that response estimates can be made for many other factor 
combinations than those physically set in the test. 
Low-order polynomials are a convenient and common form of response model fitted from experimental data. 
Such a model can be regarded as a truncated Taylor series representation of the true but unknown functional 
relationship between some response of interest (a force or moment, say), and the independent variables that 
influence that response (angle of attack, Mach number, control surface deflections, etc). Often such models are fitted 
over a limited range of the independent variables so that the resulting model—called a graduating function—can be 
regarded as a mathematical ―French curve‖ that fits the data adequately in this range. Other models are then 
developed for other ranges of the variables. By restricting the range of the independent variables sufficiently, an 
adequate fit to the data can be secured for arbitrarily low-order graduating functions. Typically we seek a reasonable 
compromise between the order of the fitting model and the range of independent variables to be fitted. 
Progress is made in an MDOE experiment through an iterative process in which a proposed model is subjected to 
criticism intended to test certain assumptions upon which the validity of the model rests. Typically this criticism 
takes the form of various tests applied to model residuals, which can be expected to contain no information for a 
well-fitted model, and which reveal trends and other information when the model is an inadequate representation of 
the underlying data. Likewise, certain distributional assumptions of the residuals are commonly tested. 
Information revealed in an analysis of the residuals may suggest improvements to the model, or the need to 
acquire additional data to fit a more complex function of the independent variables. A revised model is then 
produced, which is again subjected to criticism. This process continues until the researcher is satisfied that the model 
is adequate for a particular purpose defined during the design of the experiment. In a wind tunnel test, that purpose 
typically is to predict measured responses within a specified tolerance and with an acceptable level of confidence. 
The tolerances and confidence levels are documented as part of the MDOE experiment design process. 
A polynomial response model is structured as a linear sum of monomials, each consisting of the product of a 
numerical regression coefficient and some function of the independent variables. Suppose, for example, that lift 
measurements have been made over a sufficiently truncated range of angle of attack, x1, and angle of sideslip, x2, 
that we can reasonably assume that a 2
nd
-order polynomial would be adequate to represent the coefficient of lift as a 
function of these two variables over this range. We would then postulate the following model: 
 
2 2
0 1 1 2 2 12 1 2 11 1 22 2y b b x b x b x x b x b x       (1) 
where y represents the coefficient of lift and the bi are numerical coefficients calculated from the data by regression 
methods. 
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Regression is simply a defined computational process that will generate a set numerical regression coefficients 
for this model without regard for physical reality. For example, if there is no interaction between x1 and x2 (that is, if 
the effect on y of a given change in x1 is the same no matter the value of x2), then the x1x2 cross term would be 
superfluous and the true value of the b12 coefficient in this model would be zero. Unfortunately, unexplained 
variance present in every experimental data sample results in uncertainty in the estimates of regression coefficients. 
The result is that, except for sheer coincidence, the fitted coefficients of each of the six terms in a second-order 
polynomial function of two independent variables will be non-zero, even if the physical phenomenon represented by 
a given term does not occur in nature. 
The researcher is motivated to minimize the number of terms in a response surface model by dropping all terms 
for which the true value of the regression coefficient is zero. This is so for a number of reasons. One is that since 
each term in the model carries some uncertainty due to the experimental error in its regression coefficient, the 
smaller the number of such imperfect terms that are summed to form a response estimate, the smaller the uncertainty 
will be in that estimate. Indeed, it can be shown
4
 that the prediction variance averaged across all points used to 
generate a well-fitted regression model is simply 
  
2p
Var y
n

  (2) 
where p is the number of terms in the model including the intercept (so six for the present model) and n is the 
number of points in the data sample used to generate the model. We note in passing that n ≥ p is a condition for 
fitting a model so that in the limiting case for which n = p and there are just enough points to fit the model, the 
average model prediction variance is just 2, the intrinsic variance in the data. However, in the more general case in 
which n > p so that there are residual degrees of freedom available, the average prediction variance is less than the 
intrinsic variance of the data. This is an additional argument in favor of response surface methods for estimating 
system responses, rather than the individual measurements that characterize OFAT testing. 
Beyond reducing model prediction variance, the researcher is motivated to develop compact response models in 
order to clarify the underlying physics. In the example already cited, if there is no physical interaction between the 
two independent variables in Eq. (1), then retaining such an interaction term in the model simply adds unnecessary 
clutter. 
The process of response surface model building reduces to a series of decisions, or inferences, with respect to 
whether the regression coefficient of a given candidate term in a proposed model conveys information about the true 
system response, or whether it is due to nothing more than experimental error. Formally, we establish a null 
hypothesis for each model term except the intercept, declaring it to be superfluous. We only reject this null 
hypothesis (and therefore retain the candidate term in the model) if there is compelling objective evidence to do so. 
The decision of whether or not to reject the null hypothesis for a given term in a proposed model is made with 
the aid of a reference probability distribution. This distribution reflects the dispersion in experimental estimates of 
the regression coefficient, and is therefore related to the ―noise‖ in an experimental result. We reject the null 
hypothesis only when the magnitude of the estimated regression coefficient is sufficiently different from zero that 
we can infer that it is not zero with an acceptably low probability of an inference error. Stated another way, we 
demand a certain minimum signal-to-noise ratio as a condition for rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Reference distributions are illustrated in Fig. 1 for two regression coefficients. We generally appeal to the 
Central Limit Theorem to support an assumption that these distributions are Gaussian. If we infer that the true value 
of the i
th
 regression coefficient is indeed greater than zero, then the probability of an error in this inference, pi, is  
 
 
20
2
1
exp
22
i
i
ii
x b
p dx
  
 
  
  
  (3) 
which is simply the area under the probability density function to the left of zero, where i is the standard deviation 
of this distribution. Obviously, the further from zero that bi is, the smaller is the probability, pi, of making an 
inference error by rejecting the null hypothesis. Such an error would result in retaining a non-existent term in the 
response model, and is known as a Type I inference error. For example, if in Eq. (1) we were to retain the b12x1x2 
term when there was in fact no physical interaction between x1 and x2, then we would have made this type of 
inference error. 
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To make an inference for the regression 
coefficient of the i
th
 candidate model term, we 
simply need an estimate of the coefficient, bi, 
and the standard error in estimating it, i, as 
well as some criterion for an acceptable 
inference error probability. From the first two 
quantities we compute the inference error 
probability using Eq. (3), and then compare this 
to the criterion, which can be arbitrarily small 
but not zero. 
The regression coefficients and their 
standard errors are a function of the design 
matrix, which represents a straightforward 
extension of the familiar test matrix that lists 
independent variable levels to be set for each 
data point to be acquired in an experiment. Just 
as in the case of the standard test matrix, there 
is one row in the design matrix for each data 
point. Each column corresponds to a different 
term in the regression model to be fitted. The 
elements of the design matrix in the columns 
corresponding to first order terms in the model 
are the same as in the conventional test matrix. 
Higher-order columns are generated from the first order columns via term-by-term manipulations of the lower-order 
terms. For example, the elements of the x1x2 column are generated by simply multiplying the x1 and x2 levels for 
each data point. Likewise, columns for quadratic terms are generated by squaring the corresponding elements in the 
first-order columns, and so on. Before the design matrix is generated the variables are commonly scaled and 
centered by a linear transformation that maps them into a range from -1 to +1, with ―0‖ corresponding to the center 
of the range. This minimizes certain round-off errors that can occur when the numerical magnitudes of different 
variables in physical units are considerably different (angle of attack on the order of ones to tens and Reynolds 
numbers in the range of millions, for example). 
The reader is referred to standard texts on regression analysis and response surface modeling
4–7
 for additional 
details on the construction of the design matrix, X. Suffice it to say that two points are key with respect to the design 
matrix: 1) for a given measurement environment, the regression coefficients and their standard errors are completely 
defined by the design matrix and the resulting vectors of measured responses, which means that inference errors are 
directly impacted by the nature of the design matrix, and 2) the structure of the design matrix is defined by the 
researcher prior to the test. This is the reason that there is so much potential to influence the quality and productivity 
of a wind tunnel test or any other type of experiment by the design of the experiment. 
A 1 × p vector of regression coefficients, b, can be computed directly from the p × n design matrix, X, and the 
1 × n vector of corresponding response measurements, Y, where p is the number of terms in the fitted model 
including the intercept term as before, and n is the number of points used to fit the response model: 
   
-1
b = X X X Y  (4) 
The standard error for each regression coefficient comes from the covariance matrix, C, computed by inverting 
the product of the transpose of the design matrix (X’) and the design matrix, X, then multiplying every term by 2, 
the unexplained variance in the response measurements. 
  
1 2

C X X  (5) 
The covariance matrix is a p × p square matrix. The standard error for the i
th
 regression coefficient is simply the 
square root of the ii
th
 (diagonal) element of this matrix. These represent the standard deviations of the reference 
 
Figure 1. The magnitude of two regression coefficients, 
showing dispersion in their experimental estimates 
(reference distributions). We reject the null hypothesis for 
b
2
 but not for b
1
. 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
6 
distributions used to infer whether or not to reject the null hypothesis that a given candidate term in the model 
should be eliminated. See Fig. 1. 
This discussion has highlighted the role that probability and statistical inference plays in the response surface 
methods used in an MDOE analysis. Inference error probabilities are estimated for each candidate regression 
coefficient via Eqs. (3), (4), and (5), and compared with inference error criteria developed in the experiment design 
phase. By one common convention, the null hypothesis is only rejected if the corresponding probability of an 
inference error is no greater than 0.05. By this criterion, we require the estimated regression coefficient’s signal to 
noise ratio to be large enough that we can say with 95% confidence that it is not zero, and that the corresponding 
term does therefore belong in the regression model. Coefficients with a smaller signal to noise ratio may in fact be 
non-zero, but those terms are rejected from the model on the grounds that the coefficients are not large enough for us 
to say with confidence that they belong. 
Table 1 describes a response surface model generated in a recent wind tunnel test at Langley Research Center. 
This model represents lift coefficient as a function of the angles of attack and sideslip over ranges of those variables 
that were sufficiently constrained that it was believed a good fit could be achieved with a full second-order response 
model in the two independent variables. 
 
 
Recall that we progress in an MDOE analysis by postulating a candidate model and then subjecting it to 
criticism. We conduct a critical examination of the candidate model with the intent of identifying ways to improve 
it. In the case of the lift model represented in Table 1, we see that if we reject the null hypothesis for the first-order 
angle of attack term, the error probability associated with that inference is negligible (< 0.0001). We conclude that 
we would be very unlikely to improve the model (and would therefore be at some risk of degrading it) if we failed to 
include the first-order angle of attack term in the model. This is consistent with experience and subject matter 
expertise, from which we realize that pre-stall lift is very nearly a linear function of angle of attack. Likewise, 
decisions to retain the first- and second-order sideslip angle terms seem to be well justified. However, two of the 
five regressors have inference error probabilities that exceed our 0.05 criterion for rejecting the null hypothesis and 
retaining the term. These are the pure quadratic angle of attack term with an inference error probability of 0.0842, 
and the interaction term with an inference error probability of 0.9363. 
We interpret these probabilities as descriptive of the chance that a coefficient of the size estimated from the data 
could have been computed strictly as the result of experimental error. This probability is especially high for the 
interaction term, reflecting the fact that our estimate of the coefficient for that term is two orders of magnitude 
smaller than the smallest coefficient for any other regressor in the model and only represents 0.08 of one standard 
deviation, so a very small signal-to-noise ratio. We therefore tentatively drop both of these terms to produce a 
reduced model of the following form 
 
2
0 1 1 2 2 22 2y b b x b x b x     (6) 
By Eq. (2), reducing the parameter count, p, from six to four will have reduced that component of the prediction 
variance due to random error by a third. However, if eliminating one or both of these two terms ultimately proves to 
Table 1. Initial Regression Model. 
 
Factor Regression Coefficient 
Std Err of 
Coefficient 
Inference Error Probability 
if Null Hypothesis Rejected 
Intercept 0.5389 5.48E-04 -- 
1x , Angle of Attack 9.099E-02 5.48E-04 <0.0001 
2x , Angle of Sideslip 1.967E-03 5.48E-04 0.0050 
2
1x  -1.051E-03 5.48E-04 0.0842 
2
2x  3.188E-03 5.48E-04 0.0002 
1 2x x  6.35E-05 7.75E-04 0.9363 
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be unjustified, this decision will result in a systematic divergence between predicted and measured lift estimates. If 
this is the case and the resulting increase in systematic prediction error over the range of independent variables 
tested is greater than the decrease in random prediction error achieved by reducing the parameter count, then the 
decision to eliminate these terms will have been an improper one. 
Again, we must subject the revised model to criticism, seeking to identify weaknesses that would render it 
inadequate for its purpose, which is to predict measured lift values over a specified range of independent variables 
within an acceptable tolerance. The iterative process by which the results of a proposed model are subjected to 
criticism, revised, and retested, continues until no rationale can be found to reject the model. 
The model in Eq. (6) was tested by using it to predict lift coefficients for 16 combinations of angle of attack and 
sideslip angle within the ranges tested. Measurements were made for those points, and the residuals—differences 
between corresponding measured and predicted lift values—were computed. The average residual magnitude for lift 
coefficient was 0.0013, which indicates a relatively high accuracy for the model. However, the accuracy requirement 
for this particular test was 0.0010, indicating that the predictions associated with the response model of Eq. (6) were 
out of tolerance by about 30%. We conclude that the model is still inadequate and consider other ways to improve it. 
We re-examine the reduced model in Eq. (6) by reviewing the inferences that resulted in decisions to drop or 
retain individual terms from the full second-order model of Eq. (1). Table 1 leaves little doubt that there is no 
interaction between the angles of attack and sideslip for this particular vehicle over the model attitude ranges that 
were tested. The decision to drop the x1x2 term therefore seems sound (although a review of individual data points to 
look for recording errors or other evidence of unexplained behavior is customary). The decision to drop the pure 
quadratic angle of attack term is not quite as easy to defend. The inference error risk tolerance level was somewhat 
arbitrarily chosen to be 0.05, implying a requirement for 95% confidence in a decision to retain each term in the 
model. Table 1 shows that the estimated inference error probability was only slightly greater than 0.08, close to the 
0.05 cut-off and presumably suggesting that we could retain the quadratic term with almost 92% confidence in our 
decision to do so. Given the somewhat arbitrary nature of the declared risk tolerance criterion, it is reasonable to 
revisit the question of retaining the quadratic angle of attack term in the model. If it is legitimate to do so, then 
retaining the extra term would allow us to explain that much more of the total variance in the data, resulting in a 
corresponding reduction in the unexplained variance. A relatively small reduction in the unexplained variance could 
be sufficient to reduce the average magnitude of our lift coefficient residuals by the 0.0003 amount necessary to 
bring us into tolerance. 
There is an additional, perhaps even more important reason to revisit the decision to declare the quadratic angle 
of attack term insignificant in this case. The purpose of this analysis was to examine whether the regression 
coefficient for the pure quadratic angle of attack term could be used as an objective and sensitive indicator of the 
onset of stall. The intent was to correlate this coefficient with various configuration changes that had the potential to 
influence stall. A significant quadratic angle of attack term suggests the beginning of the slope reduction for lift that 
presages the onset of stall. 
Various alternatives are available. An easy alternative that is not recommended is to simply revise our inference 
error risk tolerance in light of developments, declaring now that we require only 90% confidence, say, before we 
decide to retain any given term in the model. This would ensure that the 0.08 inference error probability associated 
with the decision to reject the null hypothesis for the quadratic term would represent an acceptable risk, and we 
could therefore retain the term and proceed. This practice of ―moving the goal posts‖ is undesirable because it 
forecloses options we would otherwise have for entirely objective inferences. It is also dangerous because it 
provides a mechanism whereby our inevitable prejudices can influence the result of an experiment. Despite the best 
of intentions to remain neutral and objective, the fact is that there will be circumstances when we might prefer that 
the true model have a quadratic angle of attack term—perhaps to comport with a theory we have formulated or to be 
consistent with other data we have reported. There might be other times when this indicator of the onset of stall 
might be inconvenient. If we are permitted to adjust the inference error risk tolerance arbitrarily, it is too easy to 
influence the results in a direction that we might prefer, even if only subconsciously. 
Another alternative is to acquire additional data. The added data will increase precision and make it clearer 
whether the coefficient for the quadratic angle of attack term is large enough to be distinguished from zero with at 
least 95% confidence. This alternative can be inconvenient if the test has already been completed, and in any case it 
would require additional cost and cycle time. 
We now consider how to exploit a situation in which other experimental results are available to us. If the vehicle 
under investigation has been tested before—perhaps in another wind tunnel—and a similar response surface model 
has been developed and documented, it would be convenient if we could objectively combine the two results. Note 
that we might be hesitant to simply combine the raw data from the other test with ours. Between-tunnel differences 
could be attributable to such factors as differential corrections for wall effects due to a difference in methodology or 
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a difference in test section geometry, differences in instrumentation, differences in the fidelity of the model, etc. 
Such between-tunnel differences have the potential to add enough additional unexplained variance to an analysis of 
both sets of data combined, that the subtle effects we seek to illuminate could be lost in the ensuing noise. 
As an alternative, consider a case in which the first experiment has been subjected to a response surface analysis, 
and inferences have been made about whether to retain or reject terms in the response model for lift coefficient 
developed in that model. We describe in the next section how an application of Bayes’ Theorem can objectively 
combine the results of two such experiments. 
III. Bayes’ Theorem and Bayesian Inference 
We adopt a standard notation by using P(A|B) to represent the conditional probability that event ―A‖ will occur, 
given that event ―B‖ has occurred. We say that the probability of ―A‖ is conditional on ―B‖ in this case. For 
example, event ―A‖ might represent a regression coefficient in a candidate response model being non-zero. Event 
―B‖ might be the acquisition of some sample of data. In that case, P(A|B) represents the probability that the 
coefficient is significant, given the data sample. 
In general, P(A|B) is not the same as P(B|A); however, they are related to each other through a relatively simple 
relationship comprising Bayes’ Theorem. Bayes’ Theorem can be exploited to objectively revise early conclusions 
in light of new evidence, as will be shown in this section. For example, we originally concluded in the previous 
section that the pure quadratic angle of attack term in a candidate model for lift coefficient could be rejected, and we 
have now postulated additional evidence in the form of a second wind tunnel test. The question is, does the 
additional evidence indicate that we should revise our original belief about the significance (or lack thereof) of the 
quadratic angle of attack term for this model?  To address this question, we review Bayes’ Theorem and give some 
elementary examples of how it can be used. 
A. Derivation of Bayes’ Theorem 
Bayes’ Theorem is easily derived from the definition of conditional probability, as expressed in terms of a joint 
probability. The joint probability of events A and B is represented as P(A∩B) and defined as the probability that 
events A and B both occur. We define the prior probability of event ―B,‖ written as P(B), as the probability that ―B‖ 
will occur independent of whether event ―A‖ occurs. We can now express both the conditional probability of ―A‖ 
given ―B,‖ and the conditional probability of ―B‖ given ―A‖ in terms of their joint and prior probabilities, as follows: 
  
 
 
|
P A B
P A B
P B

  (7a) 
  
 
 
|
P A B
P B A
P A

  (7b) 
From Eqs. (7) we have 
          | |P A B P A B P B P B A P A    (8) 
which is the well-known product rule for probabilities. It leads directly to Bayes’ Theorem: 
  
   
 
|
|
P B A P A
P A B
P B
  (9) 
The quantity P(B|A)/P(B) is often described as the normalized likelihood function. We say, then, that the 
conditional probability of ―A‖ given ―B‖ is just the prior probability of ―A‖ times this normalized likelihood 
function. The importance of the likelihood function in a Bayesian analysis derives from the fact that it depends on 
―B‖, and thus represents the mechanism by which the prior probability of ―A‖ is modified by the observation of ―B.‖ 
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B. Illustration of Basic Concepts 
We can illustrate Bayes’ Theorem with the following example. Suppose we are presented with a coin that may 
be fair (equal probability of heads and tails) or may be weighted in such a way that the probability of tails is twice 
the probability of heads. We have no prior information about the coin so the proposition that it is fair is equally 
likely as the proposition it is weighted, based on the information at our disposal. We therefore decide to toss the coin 
100 times to test the hypothesis that the coin is fair, and we find that we get heads 43 times and tails 57 times. Were 
we flipping a fair coin or a loaded one? 
Note that the fact that we did not get 50 heads does not argue against the coin being fair. For 100 tosses of a fair 
coin we will get 50 heads more often than any other number, but the probability of getting precisely 50 heads is 
actually rather low—less than 0.08. So even with a fair coin we would expect to get something other than 50 heads 
over 92% of the time. 
The loaded coin is more likely to come up tails than heads on any one toss and so we would expect more tails 
than heads if the coin is loaded. In fact, we got 57 tails and only 43 heads. If you think this evidence favors an 
inference that the coin is weighted because there were so many more tails than heads, you should be willing to give 
odds in a wager that this is so. Given the evidence you have, what odds would you be willing to offer the author to 
entice him to bet against you in a million-dollar wager in which you win if the coin is loaded and he wins if it is fair?  
Stated another way, if prior to the test there was no reason to believe the coin was either fair or weighted, and given 
that the coin came up heads only 43 times in 100 tosses, what is the probability that the coin is fair? 
We can use Bayes’ Theorem to compute this probability by letting ―A‖ represent the event that the coin is fair 
and letting ―B‖ represent the event that we observe 43 heads in 100 tosses. Then P(A|B) is the conditional 
probability that the coin is fair, given that 43 heads were observed in 100 tosses, which is the probability we wish to 
compute. 
The quantity P(B|A) is simply the probability of getting 43 heads in 100 tosses if the coin is fair. This is easy to 
calculate from the binomial probability formula that gives the probability of ―x‖ successes in N trials, given that the 
probability of success in any one trial is p: 
  
 
 
!
| 1
! !
N xxNP B A p p
x N x

 

 (10) 
For N = 100, x = 43, and p = 0.5, P(B|A) = 0.0301 by this formula. 
P(A) is the prior probability that the coin is fair. That is, this is the probability that the coin is fair before we 
obtain any additional evidence in the form of coin-toss test results. Since we had no reason to suspect the coin was 
either fair or weighted before the test, P(A) = 0.5. 
For computational convenience in a problem like this, we re-cast P(B) in Eq. (9) by first noting that 
      P B P A B P A B     (11) 
where the bar over ―A‖ implies ―not A‖. So Eq. (11) simply states that the probability of ―B‖ independent of ―A‖ is 
the probability of ―B‖ when ―A‖ occurs plus the probability of ―B‖ when ―A‖ does not occur. From Eq. (7b) with 
obvious extensions to the ―not A‖ case, Eq. (11) becomes 
          | |P B P B A P A P B A P A   (12) 
and Bayes’ Theorem as expressed in Eq. (9) becomes 
  
   
       
|
|
| |
P B A P A
P A B
P B A P A P B A P A


 (13) 
For the current example, P(Ā) is simply the prior probability that the coin is not fair, which is 0.5. The quantity 
P(B|Ā) is the probability that we would observe 43 heads in 100 tosses given that the coin was not fair; that is, if it 
was weighted to produce twice as many tails as heads. In that case the probability of a head is 1/3 rather than 0.5, 
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and we can use Eq. (10) with N = 100, x = 43, and p = 1/3 to determine that P(B|Ā) = 0.0107. Inserting all 
calculations into Eq. (13) we find 
  
  
     
0.0301 0.5
| 0.7377
0.0301 0.5 0.0107 0.5
P A B  

 (14) 
So contrary to intuitive expectations resulting from the fact that there were several more tails than heads, we 
conclude that the coin is probably not weighted to favor tails by two to one, and in fact there are roughly three 
chances in four that the coin is fair. That is, it is roughly three times more likely that the coin is fair than that it is 
weighted to favor tails. This is because the probability of observing 43 heads in 100 tosses of a fair coin (0.0301) is 
roughly three times the probability of observing 43 heads in 100 tosses of a coin weighted to make it twice as likely 
to see a tail as a head on any one toss. Putting it another way, there simply were not enough tails observed to support 
the hypothesis that tails were twice as likely as heads. We see that the acquisition of additional empirical evidence 
has resulted in a revision of the probability we originally assigned to the coin being fair, from 0.5000 to 0.7377. To 
use the language of Bayesian revision, we say that the prior probability was 0.5000, while the posterior probability 
is 0.7377. 
To return to our initial question, you should not offer any odds to entice the author to bet a million dollars with 
you that the coin is fair, based on this evidence. On the contrary, the author would still have a substantial advantage 
if he took the bet that the coin was fair and offered you, say, 2:1 odds to bet that it was weighted. 
C. An Application to Scientific Research 
The above example was contrived to illustrate how the basic concepts of conditional, joint, and prior probability 
can be combined to revise an earlier opinion based on new evidence via Bayes’ Theorem. We now present an 
example first offered by Ronald Fisher,
8
 to illustrate the application of Bayesian revision in a scientific investigation 
in which new empirical evidence is introduced that conflicts with prior conclusions. 
Fisher considered a genetics experiment involving three types of mice. One type inherits a dominant gene related 
to fur color from both parents (designated here as ―CC‖), one type inherits the recessive gene for color from both 
parents (―cc‖), and one type inherits one dominant color gene and one recessive color gene (Cc). Any mouse of this 
particular species inheriting the dominant color gene is black (so both the CC and Cc types). A mouse inheriting two 
recessive color genes (cc) is brown. The probability that parent mice of a particular gene composition will produce 
offspring of a given genetic composition is well known from genetic theory and summarized in Table 2. 
 
 
These probabilities in Table 2 are easily established by considering two fair coins that are tossed, one 
representing the father and one the mother. Heads means the parent contributes the first gene of its ―xx‖ pair and 
tails means it contributes the second. The first row in Table 2 shows that the offspring for those particular parents 
can never receive two dominant color genes or two recessive color genes because one parent can only contribute one 
type and the other parent can only contribute the other. So the probability of an offspring with one gene of each type 
is 100%, with no chance of producing an offspring with either two dominant or two recessive genes. 
Likewise, the second row in the table corresponds to the case in which one of the parents cannot contribute a 
dominant color gene, so the probability of an offspring with two dominant genes is zero. There is a 100% probability 
that the offspring will have one recessive gene since that is all that one parent has to offer, but there is an equal 
probability that it will inherit the other parent’s dominant or recessive gene. Finally, the last row in the table 
describes the case when both parents have both genes, in which case the probability that the offspring will have two 
dominant genes is the probability of getting two ―heads‖ with two tosses of a fair coin (1/4), and likewise the 
Table 2. Probabilities of Genetic Composition of Offspring in Mice. 
 
Parents 
Offspring 
CC (black) Cc (black) cc (brown) 
CC + cc 0 1 0 
Cc + cc 0 1/2 1/2 
Cc + Cc 1/4 1/2 1/4 
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probability of two recessive genes is also 1/4. There is a probability of 1/2 that the offspring will inherit one gene of 
each kind. 
Mice with two dominant color genes are called homozygotes while those with one dominant gene and one 
recessive gene are called heterozygotes. Assume we have a black mouse that is the offspring of two heterozygotes 
(last line in Table 2). Clearly, the prior probability that this black mouse is a homozygote is 1/3 and the prior 
probability that it is a heterozygote is 2/3. So absent any other information, we would say it is likely (2:1 odds) that 
the mouse has both color genes. 
Now suppose, as Fisher did, that we avail ourselves of additional evidence in the form of an experiment in which 
we mate our black mouse with a brown one, known to have two recessive color genes. Fisher assumed that the result 
of such an experiment was the production of seven black offspring. We wish to compute, as Fisher did, the posterior 
(post-test) probability that the test mouse had both a dominant and a recessive color gene. In this case, we let ―A‖ 
correspond to the test mouse having both types of color gene and we let ―B‖ correspond to the test result that seven 
black mice were produced by mating it with a brown mouse. We wish to compute P(A|B)—the probability that the 
test mouse has both types of gene, given that mating with a brown mouse produced seven black offspring. 
In this case, P(A) is 2/3, from the data in the table, and P(Ā) is 1/3. Also from the table, the probability of 
producing a single black offspring from a Cc + cc pairing is 1/2, so P(B|A) is just (1/2)
7
. We know from its color and 
pedigree that if the black test mouse does not have both color genes, it has to have two dominant genes, in which 
case its offspring will always be black. Therefore, we know that P(B|Ā) is 1. Inserting these values for prior and 
conditional probabilities into Eq. (13) yields this: 
  
   
      
 
 
7 6
7 6
1 2 1
12 3 2|
651 2 1 11 1
2 3 3 2
P A B   
 
 (15) 
This example illustrates how dramatically prior knowledge can be altered by additional information. In this case, 
we thought before the experiment that the odds of the black test mouse having both color genes was 2:1 in favor of 
that proposition. This initial probability estimate was based on prior knowledge that each parent had a dominant and 
a recessive color gene, but when that prior knowledge was augmented with additional information from the mating 
experiment, the odds that the test mouse had both gene types changed from 2:1 in favor to 64:1 against, a substantial 
change in opinion. 
It is instructive to represent the litter of seven new-born mice as a sequence of independent ―data points‖ to 
examine how our perceptions would have changed with each new birth. Applying Bayes’ Theorem sequentially, the 
conditional probability that the black test mouse had a recessive color gene given the evidence would have 
diminished with each new birth. The corresponding probability that the test mouse possessed two dominant color 
genes would have grown with each new birth, as in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Probability that male parent mouse has two dominant color genes, given that a) the female parent 
has two recessive color genes, and b) a series of black offspring are born. 
 
New-Born Black Mice Probability that father is CC 
0 1/3 
1 1/2 
2 2/3 
3 4/5 
4 8/9 
5 16/17 
6 32/33 
7 64/65 
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The data in Table 3 are plotted in Fig. 
2. Note that our confidence that the test 
mouse has two dominant genes grows 
with each new data point in this case, but 
approaches 100% only asymptotically. 
That is, no matter how much evidence 
we acquire, there will always be some 
prospect, however remote, that the 
results are due simply to chance. Figure 
2 illustrates a general aspect of inference 
on the basis of data with uncertainty, 
which is that we can never be absolutely 
sure of an inference, no matter how great 
the volume of evidence supporting it. 
This principle can be exploited to control 
the cost of experimentation, by adopting 
a policy whereby the cost of acquiring 
additional data is no longer borne once 
the inference error probability drops 
below some prescribed threshold, or 
equivalently, once confidence in a given 
inference exceeds a specified threshold 
(95%, say). 
IV. Application of Bayesian Inference to Response Surface Modeling 
The examples in the previous section were offered as simple illustrations of Bayes’ Theorem. We consider 
examples in this section that are more directly relevant to aerospace research. We begin with an example of how 
additional information can result in an important change in the structure of a response surface model. We will also 
give an example of how Bayesian inference can be used in the validation of computational models, and how it can 
be applied in circumstances in which repetitive experiments are executed on the same test article, as when an 
instrument such as a force balance is calibrated repeatedly over time. 
A. Model Building 
We introduced an example of a response surface model for lift coefficient as a function of the angles of attack 
and sideslip that had been fitted to experimental wind tunnel data over a limited range of the independent variables. 
An inference was made in the process of developing this model that the pure quadratic angle of attack term was not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. See Table 1. However, the computed inference error associated 
with rejecting the null hypothesis for the regression coefficient of this term was still relatively small, albeit too large 
to meet our 0.05 criterion. We noted that results were available from another experiment on this same vehicle, which 
included a response surface modeling analysis similar to the one summarized in Table 1 for the first experiment. 
In the analysis of the second data set, inference error probabilities associated with decisions to reject the null 
hypothesis were made for each term in the model, just as in the first experiment. As before, if the error probability 
exceeded 0.05, the null hypothesis was not rejected, and the term was dropped from the model. If the error 
probability associated with rejecting the null hypothesis was sufficiently low (< 0.05), the term was retained in the 
model. For the second experiment, if we rejected the null hypothesis and therefore retained in the model the first-
order angle of attack, first-order angle of sideslip, and quadratic sideslip terms, the associated probabilities that these 
decisions would have been in error were again comfortably below our 0.05 criterion level, just as in the first 
experiment. Likewise, both experiments resulted in inference error probabilities well above the 0.05 criterion for 
rejecting the null hypothesis and retaining the interaction term in the full second-order model. So again we decided 
to retain both first order terms from Eq. (1), reject the interaction term, and retain the quadratic sideslip angle term. 
However, the two data sets resulted in different inferences with respect to the quadratic angle of attack term, as 
illustrated in Table 4. 
Based on the first experiment we are unable to infer with at least 95% confidence that the regression coefficient 
for the quadratic angle of attack term is non-zero. We are therefore unable to report significant curvature in the lift 
coefficient as a function of angle of attack, and would conclude that we were not approaching the onset of stall in 
 
Figure 2. Probability that male parent mouse has two dominant 
color genes, given that a) the female parent has two recessive color 
genes, and b) a series of black offspring are born. 
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the angle of attack range examined in this experiment. We reach precisely the opposite conclusion from an analysis 
of the second experiment. A Bayesian analysis allows us to reconcile these results in such a way that proper weight 
is given to both experiments. 
 
 
Let us assume that our two estimates of the regression coefficient are random variables based on normally 
distributed data samples with means 1 and 2 and standard deviations 1 and 2, where the subscripts identify the 
two experiments. It is the convention to refer to one of these as the prior distribution and to say that it is revised by 
information from the other experiment. However, this does not imply any time-ordering. That is, the ―prior‖ 
distribution does not have to have been established first. It is equally valid to say that conclusions based on results 
obtained in either experiment are revised because of information from the other one. However, we will arbitrarily 
declare the results displayed in Table 1 as having come from the prior distribution, which we will revise based on 
the additional results for the quadratic angle of attack term that are displayed in the right column of Table 4. 
It can be shown
9–11
 that the posterior distribution in such a case is also normally distributed, with a mean, 0, and 
a standard deviation, 0, represented as weighted combinations of the means and standard deviations of the two 
experimental data samples: 
  0 1 1 2 2
1 2
1
w w
w w
   

 (16a) 
 1 22
0
1
w w

   (16b) 
Where the weighting functions, wi, are 
 1 22 2
1 2
1 1
  and  w w
 
   (16c) 
The mean of the posterior distribution for the regression coefficient is just a weighted average of the regression 
coefficient estimates from the two experiments, with the weighting determined by the uncertainty in each estimate. 
In this way, the greater weight is given to the estimate with the least uncertainty. The variance of the posterior 
distribution for the regression coefficient is based on a pooling of the variances from each experiment. 
Table 4. Selected Characteristics of Quadratic Angle of Attack Term in Second-Order Response 
Surface Model of Lift Coefficient as a Function of the Angles of Attack and Sideslip. 
 
Characteristics of Quadratic Angle 
of Attack Term 
First Experiment, Table 1 Second Experiment 
Regression Coefficient -1.051E-03 -1.190E-03 
Std Err in Coefficient 5.48E-04 4,90E-04 
Coefficient as Multiple of Std Err 1.92 2.43 
Inference Error Probability if Term 
Retained 
0.0842 0.0076 
Max acceptable Inference Error 
Probability 
0.0500 0.0500 
Inference Reject Term (Err prob > 0.05) Retain Term (Err prob <0.05) 
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After inserting numbers from Table 4 into Eqs. (16), we conclude that the posterior estimate of the regression 
coefficient for the quadratic angle of attack term in our lift coefficient model has a value of 
 
   
   
3 3
3
0 2 2
4 4
2 2
4 4
1 1.051 10 1.190 10
1.128 10
1 1 5.48 10 4.90 10
5.48 10 4.90 10
x x
x
x x
x x

 

 
 
 
   
          
   
  
 (17a) 
with a standard deviation of 
 
   
4
0
2 2
4 4
1
3.653 10
1 1
5.48 10 4.90 10
x
x x
 
 
 

 (17b) 
Figure 3 compares three normal distributions for the quadratic angle of attack regression coefficient. The black 
one is the prior distribution, the red one represents the new data, and the blue one is the posterior distribution, 
reflecting a Bayesian revision of the prior distribution per Eqs. (16) to reflect the information in the new data. (This 
figure displays positive means for the distributions consistency with Eq. (3), although the actual quadratic angle of 
attack regression coefficient is negative—concave down.) 
By inserting values from Eqs. (17) into Eq. (3), the inference error probability associated with rejecting the null 
hypothesis for the posterior (revised) distribution is computed as 0.0010, down from the 0.0842 value associated 
with the prior distribution. That is, the original odds against an inference error if we retained the quadratic angle of 
attack term were about 11 to 1, or 1 chance in 12 of an erroneous inference. We had established our maximum 
acceptable odds at 19 to 1, or 1 chance in 20 of an inference error. After taking into account the new data, if we infer 
that the quadratic angle of attack term should be retained in the response surface model, the odds against that 
inference being wrong increase dramatically, from 11:1 to 999:1, or only 1 chance in a thousand of an inference 
error, well within our risk tolerance. 
We are willing to assume that much 
risk in rejecting the null hypothesis for 
the quadratic angle of attack regression 
coefficient, and we therefore retain it 
in the model, concluding that the onset 
of stall is in fact evident over the range 
of angle of attack that we examined. 
By incorporating additional 
information that allowed us to revise 
our prior conclusion about the 
significance of the quadratic angle of 
attack term, we achieved a substantial 
reduction in inference error risk. This 
was due in part to the fact that the 
signal to noise ratio for the second data 
set was greater than the first. The 
estimated regression coefficient was 
further from zero and the standard 
deviation in estimating the regression 
coefficient was less in the second data 
set than in the first. 
The revised coefficient estimate is 
a weighted average of the coefficient 
estimated from each of the two data 
 
 
Figure 3. Probability distributions for quadratic angle of attack 
regression coefficient. Area under the curve to the left of zero 
represents the error probability for rejecting the null hypothesis. It 
exceeds 0.05 for the prior distribution (black) but not for the yellow 
(posterior) distribution, revised to account for new data (red). 
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sets, and so it lies between the two individual estimates. However, it is still further from zero than in the prior 
experiment. 
The prior variance was pooled with new data featuring less variance, which suggests that the revised variance 
would be smaller on that account. It is in fact a general result that pooling the variance associated with two samples 
results in less variance than either component sample. This can be seen clearly by combining Eqs. (16b) and (16c) as 
follows: 
 
2 2 2 2
21 2 1 2
02 2 2 2 2 2 2
0 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1    

      

    

 (18) 
It follows immediately that 
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2 21
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
 (19a) 
and 
 
 
2
2 22
0 22
2 11

 
 
 

 (19b) 
The combination of a narrower probability distribution and a shift in the mean away from zero resulted in a 
greater signal to noise ratio and therefore a reduction in the probability of an improper inference associated with the 
conclusion that the regression coefficient was in fact non-zero. Figure 4 displays the regression coefficients for the 
prior and revised distributions as well as for the added data used to revise the prior. They are represented in this 
figure as multiples of the standard error in estimating them. There is a transparent colored box in Fig. 4 covering the 
range from minus two to plus two standard deviations. Coefficients lying within this box are too close to zero to be 
declared non-zero with at least 95% 
confidence, as our risk tolerance 
specification requires. Coefficients 
outside this box can be distinguished 
from zero with acceptable inference 
error risk. 
Note that the original coefficient 
estimate was just inside the box, 
reflecting the ~0.08 inference error 
probability from Table 1 that just did 
exceed our 0.05 tolerance level. The 
regression coefficient for the new 
data is comfortably outside the ±2 
range and the revised regression 
coefficient, with a substantially 
smaller standard deviation, is a 
sufficient number of standard 
deviations away from zero that we 
incur relatively little risk by inferring 
that this coefficient is indeed real 
(non-zero) and therefore belongs in 
the model. 
Even though the quadratic angle 
of attack term was the only one in 
doubt, we apply the Bayesian 
revision process captured in Eq. (16) 
 
 
Figure 4. Quadratic angle of attack regression coefficient in 
multiples of standard deviation. Magnitude must be greater than 2 
(positive or negative) to be resolvable from zero with at least 95% 
confidence. Original (prior) estimate was just inside the limit. 
Estimate from new data was resolvable as was revised estimate. 
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to each of the coefficients in the model to generate a revised model that reflects all the information in both data sets. 
We noted above that residuals from the model in Eq. (6) , in which the quadratic angle of attack term is missing, had 
an average magnitude of 0.0013, which exceeded our error budget of 0.0010 in this test by 30%. We use the revised 
model in Eq. (20) to predict lift measurements for the same 16 combinations of angle of attack and angle of sideslip 
as before. 
 
2 2
0 1 1 2 2 11 1 22 2y b b x b x b x b x      (20) 
The revised model, Eq. (20), resulted in residuals with an average magnitude of 0.0008, well within the error 
budget of 0.0010, and reflecting a 38% reduction in prediction error relative to the initial model. Figure 5 compares 
the residuals of the prior and revised model with the error budget. 
B. Validation of Computational Models 
It is not uncommon for different computational codes to produce different results, notwithstanding the fact that 
they were developed to describe a common phenomenon.
12
  One might say that to at least some extent, this is the 
norm.
13
  When multiple computational codes are evaluated, their predictions might be compared with some 
reference to determine how great a difference there is between the prediction of each code and that reference. The 
reference could be a measurement of the physical phenomenon which the codes seek to predict, or absent any 
suitable physical measurement to serve as a standard, it might simply be the mean of all code predictions. 
Consider a case in which, for simplicity, we assume that there are only two different computational codes, and 
that the validity of each is to be assessed by comparing predictions with a physical measurement. There will 
obviously be uncertainty in the physical measurement used as a reference, in the form of ordinary experimental 
error. Each code will also have uncertainty, notwithstanding the absence of variance in replicated computations.
†
  As 
a general rule, the degree of uncertainty in a code prediction depends on the combination of independent variable 
levels for which the prediction is made. There are several reasons for this, including the fact that the slope of the 
response function will generally vary over the design space, resulting in a greater or lesser impact of uncertainties in 
the independent variable settings. 
For the purpose of this example, we assume that each code is intended to quantify drag on a specified test 
aircraft, and that its ability to do so will be evaluated by comparing code predictions with flight data acquired at a 
certain set of conditions. We assume further that the uncertainty in flight measurements has been quantified through 
an appropriate analysis of test data, and 
that the uncertainty associated with 
predictions made by each computational 
code has been estimated. 
Let us say that flight conditions are 
chosen for this comparison such that the 
empirically determined drag is 700 counts 
with a standard deviation of 30 counts. 
The first code estimates the drag to be 750 
counts for these same conditions, with a 
standard error of 10 counts. The second 
code estimates the drag for these 
conditions to be 650 counts, but it is only 
capable of rather less precise estimates, 
characterized by a standard error of 60 
counts. 
At first glance it might seem as if both 
codes performed comparably in that they 
each produced predictions that differed 
from the measured flight data by identical 
amounts—50 counts. However, the simple 
                                                          
†
 The fact that a computational code will produce the same numerical result without variance for any number of 
replicates does not suggest that there is no uncertainty in a given code prediction. It simply implies that the 
uncertainty in a computational code cannot be quantified by replication. 
 
 
Figure 5. Residuals from the prior response surface model 
exceeded the error budget. Bayesian inference justified the 
addition of an additional term to the model that resulted in 
residuals that were within tolerance.  
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comparison is potentially misleading for two 
reasons. First, both of the computational 
estimates as well as the measured drag are 
random variables, describable in terms of 
probability distributions that are characterized 
by dispersion metrics as well as location metrics. 
Comparing each code prediction with the 
experimental data only on the basis of their 
location metrics (means of their probability 
distributions) fails to account for the dispersion 
(variance) in each estimate. Furthermore, the 
measured drag is itself no more than an estimate, 
subject to uncertainty just as the computational 
estimates are. The assumption that the measured 
estimate should be given more weight than the 
computational estimates is only valid if the 
uncertainty in the measured estimate is 
significantly less than the uncertainty in either 
computed value. That is not true in this case, and 
in fact the standard deviation for Code 1 is even 
smaller than the standard deviation for this 
particular sample of flight data. 
In using the measured data to assess the 
computational results, we should ask how much 
the sponsor of each code is able to learn by an 
exposure to the measured results. We can use 
Bayesian revision to address this question. We 
have the mean and standard deviation of each 
code’s distribution prior to the data, and the 
mean and standard deviation of the data. We can 
therefore use Eqs. (16) to compute the posterior 
distributions when each code’s prior distribution 
is revised by the information in the data. Means 
and standard deviations for the prior and 
posterior code distributions are listed in Table 5. 
Figure 6 compares these distributions. 
 
 
Table 5 and Fig. 6 each reveal a similar story. The revised means for Code 1 and Code 2 are much closer than 
the prior means; the prior means differed by 100 drag counts while the posterior or revised means differ by only 55 
counts. Likewise, the standard deviations differed by 50 counts originally, but only by 17.3 counts after revision. 
Clearly the sponsors of Code 2 learned more by their exposure to the measured data than the sponsors of Code 1 
in this example. The sponsors of Code 1 only needed to revise their drag estimate from 750 to 745 after seeing the 
data, a scant five-count change of opinion. The Code 2 sponsors changed their estimate from 650 counts to 690, a 
40-count change. Likewise, the measured drag data only caused the Code 1 sponsors to tighten their standard 
deviation estimate from 10 to 9.5, a mere half-count revision, while the Code 2 sponsors changed their standard 
deviation estimate from 60 counts to 26.8 after seeing the measured drag data, a change of 33.2 counts. 
Table 5. Mean and standard deviation for prior and revised distributions for two computational 
codes compared with physical measurement. 
 
 
Measurement 
Code 1 Code 2 
Prior Revised Prior Revised 
Mean 700 750 745 650 690 
Standard Deviation 30 10 9.5 60 26.8 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Flight drag distributions for computational codes 
1 and 2 (red and blue, respectively), compared to the 
distribution for measured flight drag (black).                       
a) Distributions prior to revision by data, b) Distributions 
after revision by data. 
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Note how differently we regard the two computational codes after this type of comparative analysis. Originally 
we were willing to conclude that little distinguished one code from the other, in that they each predicted the 
measured drag with the same error. After accounting for the relative uncertainty in each code prediction (and in the 
confirming measurement!), we see that conclusions based on one of the codes would be altered substantially more 
by the experimental observations than the other. 
The reason is that the uncertainty in drag estimates made by one of the codes was substantially greater than the 
other code; users of one code would have only a relatively vague idea of the drag they were estimating, while users 
of the other code would have a rather more precise estimate. In fact, in this example the users of Code 2 had less 
uncertainty in their estimates than the experimentalists providing the confirmatory measurement, while explains why 
their posterior knowledge was revised so little as a result of their exposure to this additional information. On the 
other hand, users of Code 1 began with a relatively imprecise prediction of the measured drag, and their estimates 
were subject to rather greater revision as a result of the measurement. 
We can see this situation graphically in Fig. 6a, where the prior distribution for Code 2 is considerably more 
peaked than the prior distribution for Code 1, and it is even rather more peaked than the distribution for the physical 
measurement. For this reason the data has rather little influence on the revised distribution of Code 1, while it has a 
fairly dramatic influence on the revised distribution of Code 2, as seen in Fig. 6b. 
We noted above an alternative for evaluating individual computational codes when there is no physical 
measurement available to serve as a reference against which to make comparisons. It is a customary assumption that 
when multiple estimates of some phenomenon are available, the median or the mean of those estimates is a more 
reliable estimator than any one individual estimate. It is likewise customary to regard estimates that are the farthest 
from this reference to be the least reliable (―outliers,‖ if they are sufficiently far away). This suggests that some 
appropriately weighted combination of computational code predictions might serve as a suitable reference against 
which to measure individual predictions. At the very least, the variance in an ensemble of computational code 
estimates can be regarded as an indicator of the state of the art for computational predictions.
14
 
Bayesian methods summarized in this paper are well suited for generating a weighted reference prediction 
against which to compare individual codes. Eqs. (16) suggest that a rational weighting could be based on the 
uncertainty associated with each individual code, with those codes featuring the least uncertainty weighted the most 
and those featuring the greatest uncertainty weighted the least. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider explicit methods for estimating the uncertainty of individual 
computational codes, except to say that this is an area of increasing interest in the computational aerospace 
community. The author has offered some ideas at what at this writing has been the most recent conference devoted 
exclusively to this topic,
15
 and the literature of computational uncertainty continues to grow. For purposes of 
illustration, we assume that some rational means exists by which to assign uncertainty to the response predictions 
made by each computational code. Also for illustration, we assume that three computational codes have produced 
estimates for flight drag for identical flight conditions. We will use for illustration the same estimates reported in 
Table 5 for Codes 1 and 2, and assume now that the physical measurement reported in that table describes the prior 
distribution for a third computational code. Equations 16 extend naturally to multiple distributions. For prior means 
of 650, 700, and 750, with corresponding standard deviations of 60, 30, and 10, these equations result in a mean 
weighted by the reciprocal of variance in each estimate of 742.7, with a pooled standard deviation of 9.4. These 
calculations are summarized in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Comparison of three codes with and without accounting for uncertainty in predictions. 
 
 Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 
Mean 750 650 700 
Standard Deviation,  10 60 30 
Residual 
Weighting 
by 1/2 
750-742.7=7.3 650-742.7=-92.7 700-742.7=-42.7 
No 
Weighting 
750-700=50 650-700=-50 700-700=0 
Ranking 
Weighting 
by 1/2 
1 3 2 
No 
Weighting 
2 2 1 
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Note how differently the code predictions are ranked if the reference is computed by weighting each prediction 
by the information it contains, as quantified by the reciprocal of the variance in each estimate. With no weighting, 
Code 3 has the highest ranking by virtue of the fact that its prediction lies squarely in the center of this three-point 
sample. Codes 1 and 2 tie for second place and are regarded as indistinguishable since their predicted responses are 
equally displaced from the sample median. 
However, when a weighted mean is constructed that accounts for the uncertainty in each prediction, an entirely 
different picture emerges. Now Code 1 is regarded as having made the most reliable prediction, based on its 
relatively small variance (or equivalently, the relatively large amount of information contained in its estimate). Code 
2, regarded as equivalent to Code 1 when prediction uncertainty was ignored, is now ranked in third place, again 
because its relatively large variance translates into only rather vague predictions of flight drag for the combination of 
independent variables considered in this comparison. Code 3, ranked #1 when prediction uncertainty was ignored, is 
now in second place behind Code 1 because its variance is three times larger than that of Code 1. 
Obviously the utility of a Bayesian approach to computational code evaluation depends critically on the quality 
of uncertainty estimates in the individual code predictions. This argues for continued attention to the problem of 
assessing computational uncertainty. 
C. Instrumentation Calibration 
We consider as our last example of the application of Bayesian inference to response surface methods a special 
case in which an experiment is replicated on the same test article. This situation arises from time to time in different 
contexts, but it is the norm for experiments designed to calibrate measurement systems or individual instruments. 
The same experiment is typically executed each time an instrument is calibrated. To serve as a specific and common 
example, we will consider a force balance that is calibrated repeatedly over time. 
It is customary in a force balance calibration experiment to consider only the latest calibration results in defining 
the coefficients of the transfer function that relates the balance’s electrical output to the applied forces and moments. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this same balance may have been calibrated on many previous occasions, the results of 
those prior calibrations are seldom taken into account except for occasional comparisons to determine the general 
level of agreement with the most recent calibration. Since earlier calibration results will have been obtained with 
considerable expense and effort, it seems wasteful to simply discard all of that prior information each time the 
instrument is calibrated anew. 
Bayesian inference models human learning by providing a mechanism for revising prior knowledge to reflect 
new information. In the context of a calibration experiment, this implies that information obtained in prior 
calibrations need not be lost each time an instrument is recalibrated. The calibration experiment can be regarded as 
an opportunity to obtain additional information that can be used to revise prior calibration results. 
Force balances are calibrated by applying a prescribed schedule of loads and recording the corresponding 
electrical outputs. These data are typically fitted to a calibration model using linear regression. This model can be 
used to predict electrical outputs as a function of loads, and is typically inverted to enable the specification of 
applied loads for a given combination of electrical outputs recorded in a wind tunnel test, say. 
There are different force balance designs in use but a common balance configuration measures three components 
of force (normal, axial, and side force with respect to a specified coordinate system), and three moment components 
(pitching moment about the side force axis, rolling moment about the axial force axis, and yawing moment about the 
normal force axis). Force balances are designed with the goal of producing a linear instrument capable of 
independent force and moment measurements. If that idealized goal could be achieved, then a simple first-order 
polynomial in six independent variables would be adequate to describe the relationship between any combination of 
forces and moments experienced by the balance and the electrical output produced for each force and moment 
component. 
 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6y b b x b x b x b x b x b x        (21) 
where y is the electrical output for any one of the six forces and moments (often some combination of strain gage 
outputs), the bi are regression coefficients, and the xi are applied loads. 
Unfortunately, a perfectly linear force balance with totally independent measures of the forces and moments is a 
mathematical abstraction that has proven elusive to engineer in practice. Typically there are some small interactions 
across the channels of a real force balance—the sensitivity or change in electrical output as one force or moment 
changes typically depends on the levels of other forces and moments that are simultaneously applied, for example. 
In addition to such interactions, there is generally some pure non-linearity (interactions of loads with themselves). 
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For example, the change in electrical output corresponding to a unit change in applied load if often different for low 
loads than high loads. The electrical output is in such cases is a second-order (or higher) function of applied pure 
loads. The end result of this interactive and non-linear behavior is that a rather more complex calibration model is 
needed than the one described in Eq. (21). 
For a single-piece six-component force balance, a second-order response model in six independent variables has 
been traditionally fitted in the calibration process, requiring 15 interaction terms and six pure quadratic terms in 
addition to the seven terms in Eq. (21), for a total of 28 terms in the model. Recent studies have indicated that third-
order terms may improve the balance calibrations, which imply up to 84 mathematically possible candidate terms in 
the calibration equation for a six-component single-piece balance. In actual practice, most of these terms are either 
non-existent (terms that correspond to an interaction that does not occur naturally in a given balance, for example), 
or so small that the additional uncertainty they contribute to the calibration model exceeds their influence on model 
predictions. In either case, retaining such terms would reduce the overall signal to noise ratio of the calibration. 
Ulbrich and Volden at NASA Ames Research Center have pioneered the development of new methods and 
software tools to identify and eliminate negligible terms from potentially large balance calibration models, resulting 
in compact math models and improved balance calibrations.
16-20
  Parker, et. al.,
21-25
 DeLoach and Philipsen,
26
 and 
Philipsen and Zhai
27
 have examined the use of specialized balance calibration hardware and the design of compact 
balance calibration experiments facilitated by such hardware that are scaled for reduced calibration models. 
A balance calibration experiment has in common with all response surface modeling experiments a process in 
which decisions are made to reject or retain candidate terms in a proposed model. This process was illustrated with 
the first example in this section of the paper, in which null hypotheses are established for each candidate term, and 
an inference is made as to whether that hypothesis should or should not be rejected. Each inference has a non-zero 
probability of being in error, which can be estimated and which is compared with a prescribed maximum acceptable 
inference error probability. Terms are rejected or retained in the model based on how the associated inference error 
probability compares with what is deemed acceptable. A consensus is reached and documented with respect to 
acceptable levels of inference error risk early in the formal experiment design process. 
It is possible to apply Bayesian inference methods outlined in this paper by using current calibration results to 
revise prior inference error probabilities associated with each term in the calibration model. In this way we can 
modify what we already know about the model with information recently obtained. The pooling of variances that 
occurs with each new calibration results in progressively higher precision inferences with respect to decisions to 
retain or reject terms from the model. Note that retention decisions are generally unambiguous (vanishingly small 
inference error probabilities) for the first-order terms in a balance calibration model, and can also be quite clear for 
the relatively strong interaction terms. However, for numerous model terms with smaller regression coefficients, the 
decision to retain or reject that term can turn on the level of unexplained variance in the calibration data or other 
subtle effects. It is possible that such terms might be retained in one calibration and rejected in another. 
This circumstance gives rise to an interesting model selection opportunity. Imagine a series of calibrations that 
have been performed on the same balance. The first-order terms and larger interaction terms will have been retained 
in the response model for every calibration with negligible inference error probability, however some of the terms 
with smaller regression coefficients may be retained in some calibrations and rejected in others. That is, as a result 
of the most recent calibration data, one might decide to include a term that was previously rejected or reject a term 
that was previously retained in the model. This gives rise to the notion of transitions from one calibration to another 
between one state in which a given term is retained in the model, and another state in which it is rejected. 
Over a sufficient number of calibrations, one could begin to estimate conditional transition probabilities. If we 
let the subscripts ―0‖ and ―1‖ refer to states in which a given term is missing or present in the model, respectively, 
we can define p00 as the probability that a term that was rejected from the model in the last calibration would be also 
rejected in the current calibration, and p01 would represent the probability that a term rejected the last time would be 
retained this time. (Obviously, these two probabilities sum to 1.)  Likewise, p10 represents the probability that a term 
retained in the prior calibration would be rejected in the current one, and p11 represents the probability that a given 
term is retained in two consecutive calibrations. These latter two probabilities also sum to 1. 
Let us now define 0 and 1 as elements of a 1 × 2 column vector, , describing the proportion of times that a 
given term has been rejected or retained. We assign the four transition probabilities to elements of a transition 
probability matrix, P, as follows: 
 
00 10
01 11
p p
p p
 
  
 
P  (22) 
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We then have=Pi=i+1 which expands as follows: 
 00 0, 10 1, 0, 1i i ip p      (23a) 
 01 0, 11 1, 1, 1i i ip p      (23b) 
Equation (23a) simply states that the fraction of the total number of calibrations in which a given term was 
inferred to be in state ―0‖ (rejected) is, after the (i+1)st calibration, equals the fraction that were in that state after the 
i
th
 calibration and stayed in that state, plus the fraction that were in state ―1‖ (retained) after the ith calibration that 
were then rejected in the (i+1)
st
 calibration. Equation (23b) similarly describes the proportion in state ―1‖ (retained) 
after the (i+1)
st
 calibration as the sum of those starting in state ―0‖ and transitioning to state ―1‖ plus those starting in 
state ―1‖ and staying there. 
We have described a series of discreet events (calibrations) in which the state of a given term in the calibration 
model after each calibration (retained or rejected) is a random variable (i.e., not deterministic but defined by some 
probability). This chain of events has what is known as the ―Markov property,‖ in that given the state transition 
probability matrix, Eq. (22), the state of each term in the calibration model depends only on the state of that term 
after the last calibration. Such a process is known mathematically as a Markov chain. 
Markov chains have certain properties that we can exploit in this analysis. Specifically, given Eqs. (23), the 
vector  is an equilibrium distribution if its elements πj sum to 1. That is certainly the case for this Markov chain; 
the probability that a given term in the model will either be retained or rejected after each calibration is always 1. 
The fact that the vector  is therefore an equilibrium distribution means that the percentage of times a given term 
will be rejected (or retained) approaches a constant after a sufficient number of calibrations. That constant depends 
only on the transition probability matrix, P, so the system converges to a final equilibrium state distribution that is 
completely independent of the starting distribution. 
We can compute the equilibrium state distribution for each term (i.e., the long-term probability that the term will 
be retained or rejected) by noting that at equilibrium, i=i+1, so that Eqs. (23) become: 
 00 0 10 1 0p p     (24a) 
 01 0 11 1 1p p     (24b) 
Combining this with the fact that 0 + 1 = 1, yields the following formulas for the equilibrium state distribution 
probabilities 0 and 1: 
 100
01 10
p
p p
 

 (25a) 
 011
01 10
p
p p
 

 (25b) 
We can examine certain special cases. If p10 = 0 (no instances in which a term that appears in the model is ever 
rejected in a subsequent calibration), then 0 = 0, 1 = 1, and the probability is 100% that this term will be in the 
calibration model. If p01 = 0 (no instances in which a rejected term ever appears in the model in a subsequent 
calibration), then 0 = 1 and 1 = 0, so the long-term probability that this term will ever appear in the calibration 
model is zero. If p10 and p01 are such that 0 represents an acceptably low probability of an inference error for a 
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given term, then the decision to retain that term can be made for all subsequent calibrations of this balance. If p’ 
represents that critical probability, we have the following condition for 0: 
  100 10 01 10
01 10
p
p p p p p
p p
      

 (26) 
or 
 0 01 10
1 p
p p p
p

 
     
 (27) 
Equation (27) informs us that if, for example, p’ = 0.05 as is a common convention, then we must have 
p01 ≥ 19p10 as a condition for retaining the term. That is, we incur less than a 5% probability of an inference error if 
we retain a term for which the long-term 0-to-1state transition probability is at least 19 times greater than the long-
term 1-to-0 state transition probability. Such probabilities are revealed through a series of calibrations, with prior 
calibrations contributing equally to the model selection process. 
In general, we expect that consistent calibration methods will result in relatively large or relatively small values 
of p01 and p10. That is, we do not expect terms to be equally likely to be retained in one calibration and rejected in 
another if the calibration process is consistent. This is only likely to occur when the magnitude of the regression 
coefficient is on the order of the uncertainty in estimating it, so that slight variations in the unexplained variance 
from calibration to calibration are sufficient to either mask the term or to marginally reveal it. In such circumstances 
we would tend to discard the term on the grounds that such small regression coefficients are not likely to make a 
practical difference in response model predictions, while each retained term carries with it some incremental 
contribution to the total prediction variance, per Eq. (2). That is, when in doubt we yield to a prejudice in favor of 
rejecting terms rather than retaining them. 
V. Discussion 
Bayesian inference is especially relevant to response surface modeling experiments such as wind tunnel tests 
because of the critical role that reference distributions and formal hypothesis testing play in the construction of 
response surface models. We represent an unknown response function as a Taylor series which for mild and 
commonly occurring conditions is an exact representation provided we retain an infinite number of terms. Resource 
constraints prevent the acquisition of sufficient data to fit an infinite number of terms, and in any event such 
extravagance is not necessary in practical circumstances. We are, however, always faced with the problem of 
inferring which terms to reject and which to retain. We make objective retention/rejection decisions by noting the 
location of a regression coefficient estimate relative to a reference distribution with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation reflecting the uncertainty in estimating the coefficient. If the coefficient estimate is located a sufficient 
number of standard deviations away from zero, we retain that term in the model. Otherwise, we reject it. 
Bayesian inference facilitates ―learning by experience‖ in that it permits prior knowledge to be revised by 
additional information. The role that such prior information plays has been a source of controversy historically, with 
critics of the Bayesian approach noting that reliance upon prior information in some sense diminishes what the 
current data ―is telling us.‖  Bayes himself recognized this potential criticism, and suggested in what came to be 
known as Bayes’ Postulate that such objections could be overcome by assuming a uniform prior distribution in 
circumstances for which little is known a priori. He apparently was sufficiently unsure of this point that he did not 
publish it, however. Bayes’ views only came to light when his work was published after his death by his friend, 
Richard Price
28
. 
Advocates of Bayes’ methods note that his basic theorem (Eq. (9), restated as Eq. (13)) is a straightforward 
statement of conditional probability and is not in and of itself in dispute. It is rendered controversial by 
considerations of the role that the prior distribution plays as noted above, and also by fundamental notions of the 
meaning of probability. The conventional (or ―frequentist‖) view of probability is that it is related to the frequency 
with which events can be expected to occur. Bayesians adopt a more liberal interpretation, associating probability 
with the extent to which a given viewpoint is held. A Bayesian would assign a high probability of occurrence to an 
event he felt was likely to occur, for example. This leads to the notion of subjective prior distributions, a significant 
point of contention among frequentists who argue that posterior means can be influenced to take on virtually any 
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value by a suitably selected subjective prior. This renders statistical inference, they claim, much too vulnerable to a-
priori prejudices. On the other hand, Bayesians point to circumstances in which suitable frequency-based probability 
information is unavailable and yet inferences must be made, in which case good-faith subjective probability 
estimates based on experience have a role to play. Examples include inferences with respect to rare disasters such as 
aircraft accidents or nuclear power plant failures, or other decision-making circumstances in which limited prior 
information is available, such as whether to drill for oil at a given location. In such cases, an informed but 
nonetheless subjective evaluation may constitute much of what is believed to be true before the introduction of what 
might in fact be rather meager additional evidence. 
Box and Tiao
29
 enumerate and systematically address issues surrounding the prior distribution, and develop a 
practical variation of Bayes’ Postulate involving locally uniform prior distributions. It was noted above in the 
discussion of Fig. 6 that the relative influence of the prior distribution and the additional data used to revise it 
depends on the ―peakiness‖ of the probability distributions. For circumstances in which the precision of the new 
information is significantly greater than that of the prior information, the new information will dominate the prior in 
defining the posterior distribution. For practical circumstances in scientific inquiry this is generally the case, as 
investigations are seldom undertaken absent the prospects of some resulting increase in knowledge, which implies a 
dominant role for the new information and a less influential role for the prior distribution. (In short, if we ―knew‖ 
the answer a priori, we would not have undertaken the experiment.)  For the response surface modeling applications 
considered in this paper, there is even less of a controversy. The prior distributions considered in such applications 
involve an interpretation of probability that is generally consistent with conventional frequentist notions. 
Bayesian inference is appealing for scientific research because it is based on a distinction between what is true in 
nature, and what is inferred. The cruise lift of a new aircraft may or may not in fact exceed some minimum 
certification requirement. But in either case we might have to make an inference about whether it does or does not 
based on observations we have made of a model airplane set to emulate cruise conditions in a wind tunnel. It is 
possible for the results of a wind tunnel test to suggest that the lift is adequate when it is in fact adequate, but it is 
also possible that the results will suggest the lift is adequate when it is not. Bayesian inference provides a 
mechanism for explicitly recognizing such limitations of experimentation. When we use Bayesian inference to 
evaluate the probability that ―A‖ is true given that we have observed ―B,‖ we not only consider the probability of 
observing ―B‖ when ―A‖ is true, but also the probability of observing ―B‖ when ―A‖ is not true. See Eq. (13). That 
is, we are forced to take into account the fact that our measurements are imperfect, and that it is possible to obtain an 
indication that something is true both when it is true and when it is not true. 
To illustrate this important point, consider an example drawn from the news just prior to the conference in which 
this paper is presented. In December of 2007, a report was presented to the commissioner of major league baseball, 
Mr. Bud Selig, on the use of steroids among professional baseball players. The report was accompanied by 
significant publicity, and amounted to a severe indictment of the sport and many of its key players. 
The author downloaded the full report and performed keyword searches on such seemingly relevant words as 
―accuracy‖ and ―precision‖ to gain some insight into the reliability of the tests used to detect steroids. The word 
―accuracy‖ appears exactly once in the 311-page report (in a commentary about an eyewitness report) and the word 
―precision‖ does not appear at all. Similar searches for such strings as ―inference,‖ ―false positives,‖ and ―false 
negatives‖ returned no hits. On the other hand, a Web search revealed a site apparently devoted to the topic of 
steroids in baseball that listed the names of 12 players who had experienced the league’s 10-day suspension rule for 
first-time offenses, a number nominally consistent with the Commissioner’s assertion that 1.2% of the players had 
used steroids last season, based on a combined American League and National League roster of 854 players.  
We will augment this meager information with what are believed to be reasonable suppositions to illustrate how 
a Bayesian analysis might be performed on the steroids-in-baseball scandal. (The central points of this illustration 
are not dependent on the suppositions.) 
Let us assume that a steroid test is ―95% accurate,‖ by which it is meant that if a player who uses steroids is 
subjected to this test, he will test positive 95% of the time. This means that 5% of steroid users will pass this test. 
Let us also assume that the test will exonerate non-users 95% of the time, which nonetheless means that 5% of those 
who do not use steroids will be falsely accused. 
If we use for this illustration the figure cited above by the Commissioner of 1.2% as representative of the 
fraction of players who actually do use steroids, we can easily compute how many users and non-users will test 
positive. We assume that 0.012 of the league uses steroids and 0.95 of those will test positive, so 0.012 × 0.95 = 
0.0114 of the league will be users who test positive. On the other hand, 1 – 0.012 = 0.988 is the fraction of the 
league that is clean in this example, of which 0.05 will wrongly test positive. So 0.988 × 0.05 = 0.0494 is the 
fraction of the league that will be falsely accused. We will have 0.0114 + 0.0494 = 0.0608 as the total fraction of the 
league that will test positive (roughly 52 players), of which only 0.0114 × 854, or about 10, will actually be steroid 
 American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
24 
users. Therefore, the probability that a player actually does use steroids, given that he has tested positive, is only 
about 10 in 54, or roughly 18.5%. 
The probabilities of false negatives and false positives were estimated in this example for the sake of illustration, 
although they are believed to be not unrealistic. The total number of positive tests computed in this example—52—
is consistent with numbers reported in the media for active players said to have tested positive for steroid use. 
The calculations presented in this example were rounded to ensure an integer number in each category of 
accused players (correctly accused and falsely accused). An exact calculation would invoke Eq. (13), with ―A‖ 
corresponding to a player actually being a steroid user and ―B‖ corresponding to a positive test. In this example we 
would have 
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as the exact solution, which compares with our 18.5% approximation. 
These results illustrate how much difference there can be between what is true in nature, and what is inferred in a 
test. There is only an 18.75% probability that a player who tests positive with this test will actually be a steroid user, 
notwithstanding the ―95% reliability‖ of the test. This is an example of how inferences can be quite different when 
measurement imperfections are explicitly taken into account, as they are when Bayesian inference is applied. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
This paper has provided an elementary introduction to the subject of Bayesian inference as it might be applied to 
experimental aerospace research in general, and experimental aeronautics in particular. Examples have been 
provided to show the applicability of the method to response surface modeling, to the validation of computational 
models, and to tasks which involve repeated experiments on the same test article, as in the calibration of an 
instrument over time. 
Bayesian inference extends insights available from a conventional frequentist perspective of statistics by 
explicitly accounting for the inevitable limitations of any system or process used to observe nature. It assumes we 
originally hold certain beliefs with some uncertainty, and that we try to perfect our knowledge by the introduction of 
new information that is also imperfect. This method encompasses as a special case the common situation in 
experimental research when we hold no particular beliefs a-priori; that is, when the probability associated with a 
given inference is 0.5 before we have acquired any new information in the form of experimental data. 
Bayesian inference has special practical utility in that it models the learning process that is fundamental to 
scientific research, and that is an explicit element of the Modern Design of Experiments. We make progress in 
MDOE through a series of cycles in which we alternately play the role of advocate and critic of a given proposition. 
We advance a proposed model to describe nature in certain limiting circumstances, and then subject that model to 
criticism that is often based upon the introduction of new information, itself imperfect. Throughout this process we 
modify our original perceptions to account for the new information, rather than discarding them wholesale in 
preference for a completely new set of suppositions based on the latest observations. We then subject our revised 
models to criticism, and so on, until we are satisfied that they are adequate for a particular purpose. This provides a 
mechanism of handing down information, often hard-won at great expense, from preceding cycles of investigation 
through to future investigators. 
The Modern Design of Experiments is based upon an intrinsically statistical framework in which a series of 
inferences are made about the suitability of incorporating progressively higher-order terms in a series representation 
of some system response, modeled as a function of specified independent variables. We make inferences for each 
term in the proposed model by testing a null hypothesis that asserts a-priori that the term under evaluation is 
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insignificant and does not belong in the model. We only retain such a term if we are influenced by experimental 
results to revise our initial view. 
We may initiate such a process in a state in which we are completely neutral with respect to the question of 
whether a given response model term should be retained or rejected; that is, in a state in which we assume that the 
prior probability that the term is significant is 0.5—just as likely to be real as not. This attitude is often represented 
as desirable in that it implies a laudable lack of prejudice with respect to the questions under investigation. And yet 
it does not seem illegitimate to assume that a subject matter expert would have a priori knowledge that ought to be 
taken into account. On the contrary, it seems unrealistic to assume otherwise. Bayesian inference provides a formal 
mechanism for combining a priori knowledge with new observations to generate revised insights, giving proper 
weight to the intrinsic uncertainty in what was originally believed and what has been newly learned. 
The purpose of this paper has been simply to alert elements of the experimental aeronautics research community 
to a framework for making progress that may be new to them, and which the author has himself only recently begun 
to exploit. It is by no means a comprehensive tutorial on Bayesian inference, which is far too detailed a subject to 
cover adequately in a single conference paper and with which the author claims no substantial experience. Yet there 
seems to be a number of attractive elements to this approach to scientific inquiry, not the least of which from the 
author’s perspective is its potential for seamless integration into the analytical methods of formal experiment design. 
Readers are encouraged to make their own independent inquiries and evaluations of the utility of Bayesian inference 
in experimental aeronautics research, but it is not unlikely that this topic will receive further attention as it becomes 
more familiar to researchers in our field. 
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